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Editor’s note
No apologies for the distressing cover story in this issue.
The AIDS crisis in Southern Africa has reached epidemic
proportions and threatens to inflict massive economic
damage on the region. Against this disturbing background,
Markus Haacker, until recently a member of the CEP and
now with the Research Department of the International
Monetary Fund, presents a sober, and sobering, analysis of
the economic implications of HIV and AIDS infection in the
region. Even if measures to stop the spread of HIV infection
are wholly successful, the mortality rate will continue to rise
until at least 2010.
Closer to home, and, it has to be said, less dramatic, is our
examination of the true nature of regional inequalities in
Britain. Gilles Duranton and Vassilis Monastiriotis have
looked in detail at the underlying causes of these inequalities
and conclude that their cause is not so much regional
differences as such but the different composition of the
workforce in each region. Their research suggests that far
more work needs to be done before regional policy can be
constructively revised as now seems necessary.
Anthony Venables reports on his examination of industrial
specialisation within the European Union. Such shifts in
industrial activity are to be expected as part of the process
of economic integration. Perhaps surprisingly, though, the
adjustments have been smooth and relatively painless.
Thomas Kirchmaier reports on another industrial change in
Europe: the growth of demergers. These are more obviously
beneficial than mergers and acquisitions, he concludes.
In a new departure, we have two conference reports in this
issue. The Centre is, as those readers familiar with its work
will know, a hive of activity throughout the year, with major
conferences taking place on a regular basis. Richard
Freeman reports on the conference on the Internet economy
that launched the Centre’s new research programme on the
Internet. And Leon Feinstein explains the thinking behind the
Centre’s groundbreaking conference which brought brain
scientists, policymakers and social scientists together.
And a follow-up to Alan Budd’s call for more transparency
and accountability from the Monetary Policy Committee.
Giles Radice MP, Chair of the Treasury Select Committee of
the House of Commons, responds to some of Alan Budd’s
comments and I am delighted to welcome him as the first
contributor to our letters column.
As CentrePiece enters its sixth year, it is time for me to say
goodbye. Sixteen issues is probably enough for one editor,
so I’m handing over to a new pair of hands. I offer my
successor best wishes for the future stewardship of the
magazine. I’d like to thank our many contributors since we
launched CentrePiece – with some trepidation I might add –
in February 1996. But most of all I should like to thank all
our readers without whom we could not have flourished.
Graham Ingham
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E
uropean integration has brought big increases in
trade flows between member states. In 1970, UK
exports to the six founding members of the
European Union (then known as the European
Economic Community) represented just over 3% of GDP;
by the mid 1990s that proportion had risen to 8%. This
growth in trade comprises two elements. One is intra-
industry trade, which takes the form of countries importing
and exporting similar products as firms from each country
penetrate the markets of other member states. Intra-indus-
try trade can occur even if countries have identical indus-
trial structures, and its economic benefit derives from the
fact that it is pro-competitive, intensifying competition
between firms located in different countries. The other
element is inter-industry trade: economic integration is likely
to lead to growing trade between different sectors of the
economies of member states. One key result of European
integration is that economies within the EU have come to
specialize more. This is a process that will continue.
Why countries specialise 
This national specialisation can occur for several different
reasons. One is the comparative advantage of textbook
Whatgoes 
where:
As the economies of the
European Union become more
integrated, so they are
becoming more specialised.
Anthony Venables explains that
this is to be expected and
follows the long-established
pattern seen within the US
economy: the American
experience, moreover 
suggests that Europe still 
has a long way to go. 
Integration and Industrial
Specialisation in 
the European Union
ular country’s manufacturing in each industry with the
share of industries in the rest of the EU. The index takes a
value of zero if the country has industrial structure identical
to that of the rest of the EU, and is higher the more differ-
ent is the industrial structure (see Table 1). 
Two striking points emerge from Table 1. First, countries
became less specialised between 1970-73 and 1980-83:
the index fell for ten of the 14 countries. But from the 
early 1980s onwards, the index registered a steady 
and substantial increase for all countries except 
one (The Netherlands), indicating a growing process 
of specialisation.
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By Anthony Venables
economics. Countries differ in their endowments of labour
skills and other inputs to production, or in their technologi-
cal capacities. Trade allows sectors to expand and
contract in response to these advantages, the better to
match production to each country’s supply potential.
Comparative advantage can also derive from geography.
Proximity to markets might be particularly important for
some sectors, in which case these sectors will relocate
towards regions with good market access – the centre
rather than the periphery of Europe. Agglomeration, or the
clustering of economic activity, is also important: it might
be that no country or region has any inherent comparative
advantage in a sector, but that firms derive advantage from
the presence of other firms in the same or related sectors.
The advantage can come from knowledge spillovers;
sharing a pool of common labour skills; or from forward
and backward linkages between supplier and customer
firms. Any of these forces will tend to induce firms to
cluster together in particular locations, although the initial
choice of location might be a matter of historical accident.
Integration facilitates this sort of clustering, and it will 
show up as a process of increasing national (and 
regional) specialisation.
Specialisation brings with it both benefits and costs. The
benefits are that gains from comparative advantage
depend on countries actually specialising according to
their advantages. Clustering usually brings with it efficiency
benefits, as firms can interact more efficiently with neigh-
bouring firms engaged in similar or related activities. But
specialisation also increases the vulnerability of countries
or regions to economic shocks – for example, the contrac-
tion of a particular industry in which a region is highly
specialised. The magnitude of this potential problem
depends on, amongst other things, the effectiveness of
international (or inter-regional) adjustment mechanisms,
and might be greater in monetary union, when the scope
for adjustment via the exchange rate has been given up.
We show in this article that specialisation has been occur-
ring in the EU and that – on the basis of comparison with
the US – the process may have some way further to go.
But, so far at least, the process has been gradual, and has
not been dramatic enough either to cause major adjust-
ment problems, or significantly to increase the vulnerability
of regions to industry-specific shocks.
Who does what?
We are concerned here with the location of activities that
are traded within the EU, and, in particular, with manufac-
turing, which accounts for around two-thirds of the exports
of high income countries, and approximately 20% of EU
GDP. Within manufacturing, have countries become more
or less specialised in particular industries? There is consis-
tent data for 36 manufacturing industries, across 14 EU
countries, for the period 1970-97. We have constructed an
index of specialisation that compares the share of a partic-
Table 1 How different are countries from 
the rest of the EU?
70/73 80/83 88/91 94/97
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Spain
Finland
France
G. Britain
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Sweden 
0.314
0.327
0.562 
0.441 
0.598 
0.204 
0.231 
0.319 
0.531 
0.701 
0.351 
0.508 
0.536 
0.424
0.275
0.353 
0.553 
0.289 
0.510 
0.188 
0.190 
0.309
0.580 
0.623 
0.353 
0.567 
0.478 
0.393
0.281 
0.380 
0.585 
0.333 
0.528 
0.207 
0.221 
0.354 
0.661 
0.659 
0.357 
0.547 
0.588 
0.402
0.348 
0.451 
0.586 
0.338 
0.592 
0.201 
0.206 
0.370 
0.703 
0.779 
0.442 
0.517 
0.566 
0.497 
Weighted average 0.326 0.302 0.33 0.351
Minimum values for each country in bold
One key result of
European integration is
that economies within
the EU have come to
specialise more.
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Figure 1 takes this a stage further, by combining the infor-
mation for countries grouped according to their entry date –
so EC1 is the original six, EC2 is Denmark, Ireland and the
UK, EC3 is Greece, Spain and Portugal, and EC4 Austria,
Finland and Sweden. The main point to note from this figure
is the slopes of these curves (rather than their levels). There
has been a more or less steady increase in the specialisa-
tion of the EC1 group over the entire period. For the other
groups the index starts to increase after entry to the EU.
This shows that, as theory would suggest, integration in the
EU has led to increasing national specialisation.
We can develop this still further, by constructing the index
to measure the difference between the industrial structures
of any two selected countries. Table 2 shows that the large
economies are most like each other – the lowest values of
the indices occur within the group France, Germany, UK.
However, these same countries are most different from
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Finland. (It also turns out
that Greece and Portugal are similar to each other,
although very different from Ireland and Finland.) 
The UK economy becomes more different from all other
countries except France and The Netherlands: France
becomes more different from all others except the UK and
The Netherlands: and Germany becomes more different
Table 2 How different are countries from each other?
Aus Bel Den Spa Fin Fra UK Ger Gre Ire Ita Net Por Swe
France
1980-83
1994-97
UK
1980-83
1994-97
Germany
1980-83
1994-97
0.38 0.34 0.57 0.26 0.49 0.00 0.22 0.31 0.57 0.63 0.39 0.51 0.47 0.41
0.43 0.44 0.57 0.33 0.62 0.00 0.19 0.35 0.69 0.78 0.51 0.46 0.55 0.51
0.32 0.42 0.56 0.37 0.54 0.22 0.00 0.25 0.61 0.67 0.40 0.53 0.55 0.39
0.39 0.48 0.58 0.38 0.58 0.19 0.00 0.36 0.72 0.77 0.47 0.46 0.59 0.51
0.33 0.43 0.65 0.40 0.66 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.73 0.75 0.43 0.64 0.64 0.42
0.46 0.61 0.72 0.43 0.66 0.35 0.36 0.00 0.86 0.82 0.49 0.61 0.74 0.49
Figure 1 Specialisation indices: Countries grouped by EC entry date
EC1
EC2
EC3
EC4
So far, at least, the process has been gradual,
and has not been dramatic enough to cause
major adjustment problems.
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from all except The Netherlands. Once again then, this
confirms the picture of divergence of industrial structures
from the early 1980s onwards.
What sorts of industries are going to which countries, and
what underlying factors are driving these changes? We
can identify specific characteristics of industries, and ask
what countries are attracting or losing industries with those
characteristics. For example, industries are classified by
the OECD into high, medium and low technology groups,
which can be scored two, one, zero. We can compute the
average score for each country, and compare these scores
across countries and across time. Some of the results are
striking. The technology scores are highest for Germany,
France, the UK and Sweden, although they decline slightly
for all these countries except Sweden. The largest changes
are, as would be expected, for Ireland and Finland: these
both start low and increase dramatically, measuring the
growing share of high technology industries in these
countries. The lowest levels are in Greece and Portugal,
which start and remain low. 
Industries can also be classified by their use of highly-
skilled labour. The Netherlands has the highest score on
this characteristic, indicating an industrial composition
skewed towards skill-intensive sectors. The Netherlands is
followed by the UK, Germany, France, Belgium and
Sweden, although all these countries are overtaken by
Ireland, rising from near the lowest to the second highest
from the early ’80s to mid ’90s. 
Spatial concentration
An alternative approach is to group industries according
to their initial locational pattern, and then look at how this
has changed. Table 3 classifies industries according to
the extent to which they are spatially concentrated or
dispersed across Europe. 
What determines specialisation?
How can we explain these changing patterns of 
industrial location? Economic reasoning tells us that, for
instance, skilled-labour-intensive industries are likely to be
located in countries that are abundant in skilled labour.
Industries that are intensive users of intermediate goods
are likely to locate where they have good access to
supply of these goods, and so on. Econometric
techniques can be used to see which of these interac-
tions are the most important determinants of the industrial
structure of EU countries. The results of this analysis 
are in Table 4, which lists six pairs of interactions 
(each between a country characteristic and an industry
characteristic) along with an indication of the relative
importance of each.
The table shows the changing interaction between factor
endowment and economic geography determinants of
location. The results indicate the increasing importance 
of forward linkages and of the availability of skilled labour
and researchers in shaping the industrial structure of 
each country.
Table 3 Industries grouped by levels and changes in concentration
Concentrated industries that have remained 
concentrated over time; (CC)
Concentrated industries that have become 
less concentrated; (CD)
Motor Vehicles
Motorcycles
Aircraft
Electrical Apparatus
Chemical Products NEC
Petroleum & Coal Products
Beverages
Tobacco
Office & Computing Machinery
Radio, TV & Communication
Professional Instruments
Machinery & Equipment NEC
Dispersed industries that have become more 
concentrated over time; (DC)
Dispersed industries that have stayed dispersed; 
(DD)
Textiles
Wearing Apparel
Leather & Products
Furniture
Transport Equipment NEC
Food 
Wood Products
Paper & Products
Printing & Publishing
Metal Products
Non-Metallic Minerals NEC
Shipbuilding
(Residual group of 12 industries omitted.)
The largest changes are, as would be
expected, for Ireland and Finland.
...The lowest levels are in Greece and Portugal
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Measuring up to the American experience
How much further is this process of specialisation likely to
go? The obvious place to look is the US, an integrated
market that has also experienced major reductions in inter-
nal transport costs. Recent US experience has, however,
been quite different from that of the EU, as the specialisa-
tion of US states has been decreasing. The US has a long
time series of data which indicates increasing state special-
isation up to the 1940s, followed by a steady decline since. 
More important for our purposes is a comparison of the
absolute levels of industrial specialisation in the two conti-
nents. This comparison is inherently difficult, as the conti-
nents have quite different sizes and shapes, and there is no
‘correct’ way to aggregate US states to mirror the geogra-
phy of European countries. But our analysis suggests that
US industry remains somewhat more spatially concentrated
than is the case in Europe.
The car industry
Take the location of the motor vehicle industries in the two
continents. We identified the European countries and US
states that are the main producers of motor vehicles, and
then compared their shares of vehicle production with their
shares of manufacturing as a whole. A high share shows
these countries or states are highly specialised in motor
vehicles.
Table 5 shows that the share of total EU vehicle production
for the two largest producing countries (Germany and
France) rose from 58% to 62%, while their share of
manufacturing as a whole decreased slightly: in other
words there was a small increase in the relative concentra-
tion of the industry in these two countries. In the US, the
picture is somewhat different: if we take the number of
states producing approximately the same share of
American production as Germany and France account for
in Europe, this went from two in 1970 to six in 1996. 
Yet the share of manufacturing as a whole produced in
these matching states went from 13% to 33%. So there
was considerable dispersion of US motor vehicle 
production relative to European, but it nevertheless
remained more concentrated. 
Table 4 Determinants of industrial structure: country and industry interactions
Country characteristic Industry characteristic Effect
1 Secondary and higher educa-
tion, as % population
Non-manual workers relative to manual Significant, small increase
2 Researchers and Scientists 
as % of labour force
R&D, as % value added Significant, large increase
3 Agricultural production as % GDP Agricultural input as % of total costs Weak, small increase
4 Market potential Transport costs ?
5 Market potential intermediates,
relative to mp final goods
Sales to industry as % total sales Significant, large decrease
6 Access to suppliers Intermediate goods as % of total costs Weak, large increase
The largest changes are,
as would be expected, 
for Ireland and Finland. 
The lowest levels are in
Greece and Portugal.
CentrePiece Spring 2001 7
Spatial dispersion compared
We can use the vehicle production approach to construct an
index of the location of each industry, relative to the location
of manufacturing as a whole. The result shows that EU
industry is relatively more spatially dispersed than its US
counterpart in 16 of the 21 industries. In a few, including
motor vehicles and apparel, the EU’s high level of dispersion
relative to the US has declined somewhat. But in the majority
of others, the EU pattern was and remains more dispersed
than that of the US. The index difference appears quite
modest: but it is still clear that the gap between the EU and
the US is generally considerably larger than the changes that
have actually taken place in the EU since the early 1980s. If
the EU is to follow the American patterns of specialisation
and relative dispersion there is still some way to go.
A low cost process
The changes that are occurring are slow – over a 14-year
period most economies have only seen a few percent of
their industrial production move between manufacturing
sectors. Looking at more detailed data (if it were available)
might reveal more dramatic change, but nothing in our
analysis suggests that the process is particularly rapid. This
is good news, insofar as it suggests that the adjustment
costs associated with structural change are likely to be
modest. Furthermore, the degree of specialisation remains
quite low, suggesting that vulnerability to industry specific
shocks is modest. And as integration causes industrial
specification, so it also facilitates diversification in other
activities – for example international portfolio diversification –
which would mitigate the effects of shocks. Is this process
of growing dissimilarity among EU countries going to
continue, or is it reaching some limit? There’s as yet no
evidence of a slowdown: EU industry appears to still be
more dispersed than that of the US. EU specialisation still
has some way to run. 
Table 5 European and US motor vehicle production
1970 Vehicle share Manufacturer share
EU 2 58% 46%
US 2 56% 13%
EU 4 86% 76%
US 10 87% 56%
1982 Vehicle share Manufacturer share
EU 2 59% 44%
US 4 61% 25%
EU 4 84% 74%
US 12 84% 61%
1996 Vehicle share Manufacturer share
EU 2 62% 45%
US 6 63% 33%
EU 4 82% 65%
US 13 82% 61%
Anthony Venables is Professor of Economics at the LSE and
Research Director of the CEP.
Further reading
The location of European industry, K.H. Midelfart-Knarvik, H.G. Overman,
S.J. Redding, and A.J. Venables, discussion paper no142, Directorate
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission.
Comparative advantage and economic geography: estimating the location of
production in the EU, K.H. Midelfart-Knarvik, H.G. Overman and A.J.
Venables, CEPR discussion paper no2618.
If the EU is to follow the
American patterns of
specialisation and relative
dispersion, there is still
some way to go. 
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T
he AIDS epidemic in southern Africa has
attained dramatic dimensions. The Joint United
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
estimates that by end-1999, that 9.4 million
people out of a total population of 97 million
were infected. For the 15-49 age group, the
proportion of those infected rises to 20%. The crisis is
such that even if measures to contain the epidemic were
successful in bringing down the numbers of new infections,
mortality rates would continue to rise until at least 2010.
The economic implications are alarming.
The epidemic is overwhelming available health facilities;
between 50% and 80% of hospital beds are reportedly
occupied by AIDS patients. High mortality rates among
public sector employees have led to a decline in the quality
of public services, such as education. Personnel costs are
rising – and will continue to rise – for the public and the
private sector, because of the number of people off sick,
and medical and death-related costs. Employers have less
incentive to train their staff as increased mortality rates
reduce the expected returns of training measures. The
growth rate of total GDP will inevitably fall, though the
effect on GDP per head is less clear. The capital-labour
ratio may rise due to reduced population growth, whereas
productivity and the supply of human capital will fall. 
The demographic impact
Over the region as a whole, the adult HIV infection rate
averages 19.1%; it ranges from 13.2% in Mozambique to
35.8% in Botswana (see Table 1 overleaf). This compares
to an average rate of 8.6% for the whole of sub-Saharan
Africa, and of 0.2% for the world excluding sub-Saharan
Africa. In 1999, the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS estimates that 742,100 (0.8% of the population)
in southern Africa died of AIDS-related diseases. As a
consequence, life expectancy at birth has fallen to around 40
years for most countries in the region; for the worst affected
countries, it may decline to around 30 years by 2010.
Crisis in
Southern Africa
Southern Africa is facing an AIDS crisis of epidemic proportions: 
by 1999, almost one in ten of the population was HIV positive. 
Markus Haacker examines the economic consequences of the disaster.
By Markus Haacker 
The Economic Implications of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic
A mother and child, both weakened and
sick with the HIV virus.
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Table 1 The demographic impact of HIV/AIDS in southern Africa
Total population 
1999
People living with 
HIV/AIDS
1999
Adult HIV 
prevalence 
rate
1999
Estimated 
AIDS deaths
1999
Life expectancy 
at birth
1998
Life expectancy 
at birth, 
“no AIDS”
1998
thousands thousands % years years
Botswana 1,592 290 35.8 24,000 40.1 61.5
Lesotho 2,108 240 23.6 16,000 54.0 62.0
Malawi 10,674 800 16.0 70,000 36.6 51.1
Mozambique 19,222 1,200 13.2 98,000 – –
Namibia 1,689 160 19.5 18,000 41.5 65.3
South Africa 39,796 4,200 19.9 250,000 55.7 65.4
Swaziland 981 130 25.3 7,100 38.5 58.1
Zambia 8,974 870 20.0 99,000 37.1 56.2
Zimbabwe 11,509 1,500 25.1 160,000 39.2 64.9
Southern Africa 96,545 9,390 19.1 742,100 – –
Sub-Saharan Africa 596,272 24,500 8.6 2,200,000 – –
Global total 5,362,577 9,800 0.2 600,000 – –
(excluding sub-Saharan Africa)
Data sources: UNAIDS (2000) for columns 1-4, and U.S. Bureau of Census (1998) for columns 5-6.
Patients in a ward of the 
Nhkotakota Hospital queue up 
at 4am for their medication
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By 2010 ... the population growth will fall close to zero for Lesotho, Mozambique
and Namibia and will turn negative for Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
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The combination of increased mortality and decreasing
fertility has already led to a marked slowdown in the rate of
population growth. By 2010, the International Programs
Center at the U.S. Bureau of Census projects that the
population growth rate will fall close to zero for Lesotho,
Mozambique, and Namibia, and that it will turn negative for
Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The increase in
mortality rates is most pronounced for the population
between ages 15 and 49, where AIDS-related deaths
account for an estimated 65-90% of total deaths in 2000.
Health
Can health services cope with the increase in AIDS-related
illnesses? Can the most up-to-date and powerful AIDS
treatments be made available in southern Africa? It’s diffi-
cult to see how. Current estimates of the total cost of treat-
ing an AIDS patient in the region (excluding combination
therapies) range from 72% (South Africa) to 144%
(Zimbabwe) of a country’s annual GNP per head. These
estimated cost per case, together with estimates of the
number of AIDS cases, suggest that, in 1999, the demand
for AIDS-related health services amounted to between
0.6% (Mozambique) and 1.8% (Botswana) of total GDP.
The actual cost incurred by treating AIDS patients would
be lower, simply because health facilities in the region are
limited, and so is the coverage offered by medical insur-
ance schemes. But even meeting only 50% of the demand
for additional health services would push total public health
expenditure up by between 11% (for South Africa) and
33% (for Botswana); total health expenditure would rise by
between 5% (South Africa) and 21% (Botswana). It’s
already clear from local indicators that health services are
being overwhelmed by the demand. Even if health facilities
were expanded rapidly, the quality of health services in
Southern Africa would probably continue to decline. The
number of AIDS cases is expected to continue to rise
sharply: it may at least double for six of the nine countries
in the region by 2010. At the same time, health staff are
affected by the epidemic as well, and it will be difficult just
to maintain current numbers of doctors or nurses, rather
than increasing them significantly to meet rising demand.
Education
With mortality among teachers rising and student numbers
declining, what impact will the epidemic have on educational
standards? One way to try to answer this is to focus on the
number of new teachers required to maintain given pupil-
teacher ratios. This would reflect changes in the numbers of
students, as well as changes in the size of the teaching
body. Table 2 shows that, in 2000, 45% of all newly qualified
teachers in the region will have found themselves replacing
AIDS victims; this ratio will rise to 67% by 2010. The total
number of new teachers required will increase only
modestly, or even in some areas will fall, as the anticipated
number of pupils declines. But as a proportion of a cohort
entering the labour market, the number of required new
teachers will rise. In Zimbabwe, for example, the share of
those completing secondary education who will be needed
as teachers is likely to rise from about 2% to more than 3%.
These figures cast doubt on the ability of those countries
affected to preserve even current standards of education, let
alone plan for improvements.
The cost to business
HIV/AIDS affects companies in several ways: through its
adverse effect on productivity; increased medical and
death-related costs; and a decline in the supply of skilled
Table 2 The impact of HIV/AIDS on the education sector
Pupil-teacher ratios Total number of
pupils (thousands)
Required teacher
training
Training to replace
AIDS victims
AIDS deaths, % of
total training
primary secondary 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Botswana 25 17 452 437 1059 1008 164 611 15.5 60.6
Lesotho 47 24 471 502 646 817 141 395 21.8 48.3
Malawi 64 45 3295 3398 3462 3135 940 1413 27.2 45.1
Mozambique 58 33 1769 1901 2287 2466 447 1218 20.0 49.4
Namibia 32 21 509 522 1398 1362 618 791 44.2 58.1
South Africa 27 26 11421 9160 21700 16476 11436 12922 52.7 78.4
Swaziland 34 19 256 333 775 986 151 533 19.5 54.1
Zambia 39 – 1614 1876 3022 3298 998 1249 33.0 37.9
Zimbabwe 39 28 3269 2669 5448 4368 2960 3610 54.3 82.6
Data sources: IMF staff projections and calculations, based on demographic
projections from the U.S. Bureau of Census and historical data on the
numbers of pupils and teachers in primary and secondary education from the
UNESCO Statistical Office. Data for Zambia refer to primary education only.
Companies relying on skilled workers will find it difficult to
replace workers who have fallen prey to AIDS.
workers. The incentives for companies to invest in training
will also fall. Productivity declines as the state of health of
employees suffering from AIDS deteriorates, as absen-
teeism increases, and as the replacement of workers who
die or have to leave the company results in disruptions to
the production process. The few case studies available
suggest that for a company in which 1% of the workforce
suffers from AIDS, these losses in productivity may well
amount to 0.5-1% of the wage bill.
Many companies in the region currently provide medical
benefits and pensions or lump-sum benefits to surviving
dependents. For Zimbabwe, a country with a well-devel-
oped insurance sector, UNAIDS reported that by 1998 life
insurance premiums had quadrupled as a result of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Similarly, a study by Metropolitan Life
for the manufacturing sector in South Africa estimates that
the costs of risk benefits will rise from 7% of the wage bill
in 1997 to 14.6% in 2007, largely due to HIV/AIDS.
Companies relying on skilled workers will find it difficult to
replace workers who have fallen prey to AIDS. While
unskilled workers may, to some extent, be replaced by
previously unemployed or workers from the informal sector,
this is generally not possible for skilled employees. At the
same time, companies will be less willing to provide train-
ing to employees. One way of measuring the returns from
investments in human capital to companies is to assume
that these are proportional to the time an employee can be
expected to stay with the company, discounted by an
appropriate interest rate. If mortality rates among employ-
ees were to rise from 0.25% to 3%, the returns from train-
ing employees would fall by 15%. In order to maintain a
constant number of trained employees, the same analysis
suggests that the company’s training budget would have to
increase by 54%.
So the impact of HIV/AIDS on companies will be substan-
tial. For a company in which 3% of the workforce die of
AIDS in a given year, the total resulting cost may amount to
10% of wage costs. At the same time, the supply of skilled
employees can be expected to contract. As a result,
competitiveness will decline, making it difficult to attract
investment into manufacturing, export-oriented industries.
Economic growth and per capita income
The implications for economic growth and per capita income
are equally significant. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is likely to
affect growth through its effects on productivity, the supply
of labour, human capital, and physical capital. For the
purposes of this analysis a neoclassical model has been
used, a key assumption of which is that human capital can
take two forms, education and experience. Education
reflects the average level of schooling of the labour force,
which may change as the quality of the education system
changes, or if HIV infection rates differ across skill
categories. Because data for the region is poor, education is
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Table 3 The impact of HIV/AIDS on per capita income,
“medium run”
Change in GDP per capita
(%)
Botswana -4.9
Lesotho -3.6
Malawi -3.3
Mozambique -2.9
Namibia -4.0
South Africa -3.1
Swaziland -3.9
Zambia -3.7
Zimbabwe -3.8
assumed to remain constant for the purposes of the analy-
sis. Experience represents skills acquired through learning
on the job. The level of experience depends on the number
of years in the workforce, and is specified in such a way that
efficiency increases by an average 1.5% with each year
spent in the workforce. When the labour force grows
rapidly, the average level of experience is low, because
younger (i.e. inexperienced) cohorts are relatively large. If
mortality rates among the workforce rise, the average level
of experience will also decline, as more workers die early.
The analysis also assumes that for a company which has
1% of its workforce affected by AIDS, total factor productiv-
ity falls by 0.5%; and that households affected by AIDS do
not save, thus reducing domestic private investment. The
levels of foreign direct investment and of public investment
are assumed to stay constant as a proportion of GDP. The
two main channels through which the epidemic affects GDP
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Table 4 The impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on 
per capita GDP, “long run”
Change in GDP 
per capita (%)
Botswana +12.9
Lesotho +10.5
Malawi +6.7
Mozambique +5.7
Namibia +7.7
South Africa +10.3
Swaziland +9.8
Zambia +7.8
Zimbabwe +11.1
Data sources: IMF staff estimates.
per capita are its effect on the capital-labour ratio and the
impact on human capital. The capital-labour ratio will rise
mainly because the rate of growth of the labour force
declines. In measuring the impact on human capital, it is
important to distinguish between the “medium run” and the
“long run”. Initially, HIV/AIDS affects the level of human
capital only through increased mortality. As more workers
die, the level of experience in the workforce, and thus of
human capital, falls.
But in the long run, the number of new entrants to the
labour force will grow at a slower rate, once the generation
born after the HIV epidemic has spread enters the labour
market. This alone would mean that the size of younger
cohorts relative to the size of the workforce will fall, and
that the average level of experience in the workforce will
therefore rise. In the medium run (until about 2020), per
capita income is projected to decline by between 3% and
5% for the countries covered here (compared with a situa-
tion with no AIDS), mainly because of a decline in the level
of human capital.
In the long run (by 2050), most of the negative effect of
increased mortality rates on the average level of human
capital is offset by the decline in the growth rate of the
number of new entrants to the labour force. Thus, the level
of GDP per head might increase, responding mainly to an
increase in the capital labour ratio. These results apply to an
open economy. If capital is perfectly mobile, the increase in
the capital output ratio, corresponding to a decline in the
returns to capital, would trigger a capital outflow until the
capital output ratio is back at the original level. In this case,
output per head would decline by 7%-15% in the medium
term, and by 1%-3% in the long run.
A disaster in progress
It is hard to underestimate the scale of the demographic,
social, and economic impact of the AIDS epidemic in
southern Africa. Mortality rates for the working-age popula-
tion (ages 15-49) will increase dramatically, and under-age
AIDS orphans will make up between 3.4% (Lesotho) and
7.2% (Botswana) of the population. Health services are
already overwhelmed by the epidemic, and it is difficult to
see how even the current standards of education can be
maintained. Personnel costs in the region will increase
significantly, quite possibly resulting in a decline in invest-
ment. At least for the next two decades, the average level
of human capital per worker will decline, as the number of
experienced workers declines.
On the positive side, governments and private enterprise in
the region, as well as NGOs and various international
organisations, are making major efforts to halt the spread
of the disease. Measures to combat the spread of HIV
range from a broad national education campaign, starting
early in primary school (which was successful in bringing
down HIV infection rates in Uganda, for instance), preven-
tion measures targeted at high-risk groups (e.g. migrant
workers or prostitutes) to training and measures to 
make condoms freely available within companies.
Strenuous though these efforts now are, however, they
cannot reverse the damage already done: mortality rates
will rise for several years to come whatever measures are
taken now.
Markus Haacker is an economist in the Research Department
of the International Monetary Fund. He was a member of the
CEP from 1996-99.
Except where otherwise stated, all numbers and tables are
taken from: Markus Haacker, The Economic Consequences 
of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, International Monetary 
Fund, 2001.
Data source: International Programs Center, U.S. Bureau of
the Census.
A female medical ward, where all the
floor space is taken up by patients and
their guardians
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Corporate
demergers:
or is divorce more attractive 
than marriage?
Are mergers going out of
fashion? Thomas Kirchmaier
looks at the latest corporate
trend – demergers.
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I
n the last few weeks, it has seemed that it could not be
long before the whole of the British industry was
merged into a single company. …Never has the cult of
gigantism gone so far” wrote John Kay in the Financial
Times recently. It’s true that Britain and other Western
economies have experienced an unprecedented wave
of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity over the last two
decades. It was driven by a common hunger amongst
many CEOs to increase the size of their corporation. The
trend has persisted despite the fact that the impact of
mergers and acquisitions on a firm’s profitability remains
very uncertain. For example, the available academic
evidence on the performance effects of America’s merger
waves over the last 100 years suggests that, on average,
mergers and acquisitions did not help to improve the
performance of the firms involved. In fact they more often
destroyed value than created it. Reasons for the failure are
plentiful, but it seems that managers systematically under-
estimate the problems attached to the merger and acquisi-
tion process. 
Perhaps some managers are getting the message. While
M&A activity has been – and, in certain sectors at least,
remains – intense, there has also been a growing number
of demergers. The CEP has been analysing the impact of
demergers on shareholder wealth. The results of the analy-
sis are striking: whereas mergers bring, at best, question-
able benefits, demergers by contrast are in most cases
clearly beneficial for shareholders.
What are demergers exactly? 
In a demerger, usually referred to in the US as a spin-off, a
company is split into two or more fully independent parts. A
wholly-owned subsidiary becomes an independent entity,
with its shares being distributed to the shareholders of the
parent company on a pro-rata basis. This process is
considered to be a non-cash dividend by the parent firm
and is tax-free provided that a substantial proportion
(though not necessarily all) of the shares in the spin-off are
distributed to the shareholder at no cost. Demergers are
sometimes confused with an equity carve-out in which a
minority stake in a company is sold to the wider public in an
Initial Public Offering (IPO). Demergers are an American
invention of the 1920s and have been a common feature in
America since the 1950s. In 1980, Geoffrey Howe, then
British Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced tax incen-
tives for demergers to facilitate the de-conglomeration of
British industry. He reasoned: “There are cases where
businesses are grouped together under a single company
umbrella. They could in practice be run more dynamically
and effectively if they could be demerged (…) and allowed
to pursue their own separate ways under independent
management”. This legislation paved the way for the first
British demerger. In 1990, the European Community
adopted demerger legislation, thereby introducing the
concept of demergers to many European countries for the
first time. Since then demergers have been taken up very
slowly in most European countries, with the bulk of
European demergers being of British origin. 
What’s the impact?
Demergers are of interest for a variety of reasons. First and
foremost, are they a form of corporate restructuring that
can create value for the shareholder? Demergers also
make it possible to evaluate changes in the size of an
organisation and its impact on performance. If an increase
in size through M&A has at best no impact on perfor-
mance, would the inverse process have a similar impact?
Analysing demergers also enables us to assess the impact
of corporate focus, one of the key management phrases of
the last two decades. 
Value creation through demergers
The CEP study examined European demergers, most of
them British, which took place over the past ten years. We
used shareholder wealth as an indicator of firm perfor-
mance. The results showed that, unlike mergers, demerg-
ers are indeed on average beneficial for the shareholder.
Often they are preceded by a period of distinct underper-
formance compared with a market benchmark. Demerger
announcements appear to be welcomed by the market.
Announcement effects are particularly important when
assessing demergers or similar events. If financial markets
are operating efficiently, the response to new information
should be immediate and correct at the time of the
demerger announcement. Ideally, the market should
correctly anticipate all future value gains (or destruction)
from such an event and adjust the market price accord-
ingly. Looking at the results of individual firms we can see
that demergers do not guarantee success. The announce-
ment effects are very diverse, with one quarter of all
announcement effects being received negatively by the
markets.  Over the three years following the demerger, the
spin-off or smaller part seems to do considerably 
better than the parent firm. Whereas the parent tended
slightly to underperform the market, the spin-off 
significantly outperformed it by approximately 18% after
three years, with most of the value creation occurring in
year two after the demerger. It seems that it takes the
spin-off roughly one year to reorganise itself in a way that
allows it to reap the benefits of the restructuring activity.
Combining the performance effect of parent and spin-off
and weighting them according to their relative market 
value shows no statistically significant effect. Taken
together, the market appears to have correctly predicted
the long-term effect of a demerger. The long-term results
are depicted in the chart (overleaf). 
By Thomas Kirchmaier
“
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Demergers of hidden jewels have been particularly
successful. These are business units that were, for one
reason or another, starved of cash within the former parent
company. For the purposes of our analysis, these hidden
jewels are defined as those demergers that were able to
raise new capital in the market within weeks after the
break-up. In this type of demerger, the announcement had
a beneficial effect on shareholder wealth of 14% for the
three-day time window analysed. The long-term effects
seem to be particularly strong but because there is only a
small number of firms in this category the results are not
statistically significant and should only be taken as anecdo-
tal evidence. Nevertheless, the evidence available from
similar cases in America (such as Lucent Technologies)
appears to support these findings.
Demerger announcements of small firms were more
successful, on average, than those of large ones. The long-
term effects, however, show quite a different picture. On a
combined basis, large firm demergers underperformed the
market by 20%. The dismal performance of the large
parent firm is responsible for this as a result of significantly
underperforming the market by 29% in the three years
after the demerger. The reverse happens with smaller firms
where the market tended to underestimate the positive
effect of a small firm’s demerger. In the following three
years, parent and spin-off together significantly outper-
formed the market by 26% after a positive announcement
effect of 7%. The results are surprising as they somehow
indicate that a reduction in size and an increase in corpo-
rate focus only seem to have a positive impact on smaller
firms. Intuitively one would have expected the contrary
effect, or no difference at all between the two groups. To
Measuring the benefits of demergers
0
The chart shows the cumulative abnormal return (the return of
the individual stock minus the return of the market accumu-
lated over time) measured by the number of trading days after
the demerger for all the demergers included in the study.
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Trading days after demerger
The available
academic evidence
on the performance
effects of American
merger waves over the
last 100 years suggests
that, on average, mergers
and acquisitions did not help
to improve the performance
of the firms involved.
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test if the size of the demerged entities determines perfor-
mance, the sample was divided by size at the time of the
demerger. This reinforced our findings that smaller spin-offs
are far more successful than larger ones, and that smaller
parent firms are more successful than larger ones following
a demerger. The performance difference between large
firms and small firms is about 30% in both cases. In part
this is because of the higher takeover likelihood of smaller
firms. In particular, smaller parent firms are more likely to
be taken over than larger ones. But takeover likelihood
cannot fully explain the performance difference between
large and small demergers. 
The motivations for demergers
There are many explanations for the value creation of
demergers. Firstly, there is the initial argument of untan-
gling conglomerates that were created in the 1960s and
1970s but by the 1980s had ceased to add value with the
advancement of the capital market. In addition, there is
some anecdotal evidence that by demerging, firms can
recover some of the value that was destroyed in an unsuc-
cessful merger or acquisition. It might therefore be reason-
able to expect that some of the firms currently involved in a
value-destroying merger or acquisition will attempt to
demerge parts at some point in the future. Some firms
might find that they become simply too big (either through
organic growth or acquisition) thereby experiencing disec-
onomies of scale. The costs of running large organisations
in this case outweigh the benefits, making it beneficial to
create smaller entities. Some firms diversify into an appar-
ently related business, without analysing rigorously enough
whether this business fits their core resources, i.e. the
firm’s unique assets, skills and capabilities. Synergies that
appeared to exist ex-ante turn out to be destroying value
after the transaction. Demergers are a relatively easy way
to undo the merger process. 
As mentioned above, corporate focus has been the
managerial buzzword since the 1980s and 1990s. It is
claimed that focused firms are more successful than diver-
sified ones. This idea is intuitively convincing: it is better to
do one thing well than many things badly. But what is it that
makes corporate focus such a convincing concept?
Consistency seems to provide a partial answer. A firm’s
strategy is dependent on having the appropriate organisa-
tion to deliver its products or services, and its control
mechanisms, employee skills and incentive systems need
to be in line with its business. The integration and optimisa-
tion of all parts of an organisation can be essential to a
firm’s success. 
Changes in the economic and technological environment
can make obsolete combinations of business units that
made sense in the past. In this case there is nothing to be
gained – and perhaps much to be lost – by keeping them in
one organisation, especially since two head offices might
have much better parenting skills. In this case and others, a
demerger will also avoid cross-subsidisation and the
creation of large bargaining costs between the business
units. Independent parts cannot fight over the same pool of
resources. Most importantly, however, demergers are a
deliberate move by the CEO to increase corporate focus.
They are therefore likely to remain a feature of the corpo-
rate restructuring scene for the foreseeable future.
Thomas Kirchmaier is a member of the Centre for Economic
Performance.
Demergers of “hidden jewels” have 
been particularly successful.
Mind The Gap
How much does Britain’s 
north-south divide matter?
The growing regional divide
in Britain has been a
political headache for
decades. Gilles Duranton 
and Vassilis Monastiriotis
explore the causes of the
gap and try to untangle the
confusion between
perception and reality.
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O
n the face of it there’s no mistaking the extent of
regional inequality in Britain. Aggregate figures
from the Office for National Statistics show that
in 1982, average earnings in London and the
south east were, respectively, 121% and 103% of the
national average: by 1997, those ratios had risen to 137%
and 109%. Using regional GDP per capita instead of
average earnings gives a similar picture. And comparable
inequalities across UK regions can be found for unemploy-
ment, educational attainments, and even mortality. This is
the notorious north-south divide, a prosperous south east
and an increasingly impoverished north. 
These figures, however, are quite misleading. A more
useful comparison would be to use not the average wages
of workers across regions, but the wages of specific
groups of workers across regions. This makes it possible
to distinguish those inequalities which result from workers
in the same jobs being paid different rates from inequalities
which reflect the different composition of the workforce in
different regions. The result is a somewhat different picture
of the extent and nature of regional inequalities.
It’s what you measure
Figure 1 uses the conventional approach: it plots the
average relative nominal wage for three regional groupings
between 1982 and 1997. Figure 2, by contrast, plots
average nominal wages for a specific hypothetical worker,
a 25 year-old with secondary education. This shows a strik-
ing difference from the traditional analysis. London and the
south east are much closer to the national average with
London actually being below the south east at the end of
the period. There is also evidence of convergence between
the three regions. This pattern is repeated for other,
similarly constructed hypothetical cases. Once the distribu-
tion of human capital is controlled for, the regional returns
of all key labour market characteristics (education, experi-
ence and sex) and regional fixed-effects converged during
the 1980s and 1990s. 
How can we explain the very different results obtained from
the two approaches? There seem to be three principal
factors. First, London had, initially, lower returns to educa-
tion. The catch-up in returns to education implied large
gains in average wages in London. Second, during the
1980s and 1990s, inequality among individuals rose in
every region. Rising inequalities between skilled and
unskilled, in combination with the uneven spatial distribu-
tion of human capital, helped magnify aggregate UK
regional inequalities. And, third, rising average educational
attainment in London and the south east relative to the rest
of the country also played a role in explaining the aggrava-
tion of regional inequalities. 
The questions to be answered
Our findings reflect two questions:
Do ÒsimilarÓ individuals have the same 
wage across UK regions? 
How have the differences, if any, evolved 
in the last 20 years?
We used data from the Family Expenditure Survey for
1982-1997, examining a number of specific characteristics,
including sex, education and labour market experience, for
each region and each year. Educated workers, for
instance, earn, on average, more than less-educated
workers, males earn more than females and experienced
workers earn more than workers with no labour market
experience. Workers tend to accumulate skills at the begin-
ning of their career which subsequently become obsolete.
By Gilles Duranton and Vassilis Monastiriotis
Figure 1 Average regional earnings in the UK 1982-97 
(UK Average = 100%)
Figure 2 Nominal regional earnings for a 25 year-old with 
25 years of education employed full-time. 
(UK Average = 100%)
Key for figures 1 and 2
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Over the life cycle, therefore, wages first increase, then
peak before starting to decline. Our calculations specifi-
cally took account of these factors.
Our analysis produced five specific and relevant factors,
again for each region and each year:
The gender gap, that is how much differences in
wages were affected by whether workers were male or
female;
The returns to education, which indicates by how much
wages increase for each extra year of schooling;
The returns to experience, which shows the impact of
one year’s experience on an individual’s wage; 
The depreciation of skills, which takes account of any
negative impact on wages flowing from time away from
education;
The regional fixed-effect, i.e. the basic wage that
someone with no experience and minimum education
in any particular region.
It is instructive to average the results across regions to
observe national trends over the period 1982-1997. These
trends are very clear and point towards a slight decline in
the fixed-effects, i.e. a decline in the wage of a hypothetical
uneducated male with no experience. They also document
a strong decrease (of around a quarter) in the gender gap
as well as strong increases in both the returns to education
and experience. These “national” results are very much in
line with previous findings regarding the evolution of wage
inequalities in the UK. However, in spite of these marked
national trends, regions have behaved differently. 
The gap in regional fixed-effects at the beginning of the
period was very large at 0.9 (from 3.35 in Northern Ireland
followed by the north west with 3.77 to 4.25 in London at
the other extreme). For the end of the period, the range is
much smaller at 0.41 (minimum for Northern Ireland at
3.72 and a maximum for London at 4.13). Again, extrapo-
lating these figures suggest that the differences in base
wages across regions would disappear after 22 years. 
The regional divergence for the gender gap was also
initially very large at 19% (from 43% in the south east to
26% in Northern Ireland and 24% in London). But by the
end of the period, the range had fallen to 14% (19% in
London and 33% in East Anglia). Extrapolating these
figures suggests that the regional divergence would disap-
pear altogether after 26 years.
For education, too, the pattern of declining divergence is
visible. The annual returns initially ranged from 6.0% in
London to 9.6% in the north west and 10.5% in Northern
Ireland. At the end of the period the extremes remained
Figure 3 Regional convergence in the real fixed-effects
Trend 1982-97
Figure 5 Regional convergence in the returns to education
Trend 1982-97
Figure 4 Regional convergence in the gender gap
Trend 1982-97
A more useful comparison would be to use not the average wages of workers
across regions, but the wages of specific groups of workers across regions.
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Figure 6 Regional convergence in the returns to experience
Trend 1982-97
Figure 7 Regional convergence in the depreciation 
of experience. Trend 1982-97
London with 7.4% at the bottom end and Northern Ireland
with 10.4% followed by Yorkshire with 10.3% at the top
end: that’s a fall of more than one third, from 4.5% to
2.9%. But regional differences in education returns will
disappear more slowly than the other measures we
examined – again extrapolating our findings, convergence
is likely to take 35 years. This is partly because London
has persistently lower returns to education and is converg-
ing only slowly with the rest of the country. 
Convergence is particularly strong for the returns to experi-
ence. The lowest returns were initially in the north with
4.8% whereas the highest were in Northern Ireland with
7.9%. By the end of the period, the range had only fallen
from 3.1% to 1.4% with the extremes being the south
west with 5.5% and East Anglia with 6.9%. The conver-
gence periods are likely to be 12 years for experience and
nine years for the depreciation of experience. 
Convergence in every single dimension stands in sharp
CentrePiece Spring 2001
Rising inequalities between skilled
and unskilled ... helped magnify
aggregate UK regional inequalities.
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Table 1 Decomposition of aggregate increase in 
regional inequalities.
Increase in regional inequalities 1982-1997 100.0%
Component 1: changes in characteristics -31.6%
Gender 9.7%
Education -51.0%
Experience 9.7%
Component 2: changes in cross-region 
differences in characteristics 39.0%
Gender 16.0%
Education 58.8%
Experience -35.8%
Component 3: changes in prices 23.8%
Gender 6.3%
Education 23.9%
Experience -6.4%
Component 4: changes in cross-region 
differences in returns 68.9%
Fixed-effects -32.0%
Gender -21.9%
Education 114.9%
Experience 7.9%
Total 100.0%
contrast with the rising wage gaps observed in the aggre-
gated figures. This discrepancy can only be resolved by
looking at regional structures.
How regional inequalities evolved
For simplicity, we looked only at the evolution of regional
inequalities between London and the nine regions between
1982-83 and 1996-97 (Northern Ireland has a behaviour
that is different from the rest of the UK whereas the south
east is somewhat halfway between London and the nine
other regions of Great Britain). We broke down the aggre-
gate increase in regional inequalities into 
(1) changes in the characteristics across the country
(e.g. an increase in average education); 
(2) changes in the differences in characteristics across
regions (e.g. the increase in education being
stronger in London); 
(3) cross-country changes such as the impact of a
lower gender gap; and 
(4) changes in the differences across regions such as
a narrowing of the cross-regional differences in the
gender gap.
The results are in Table 1.
The evolution of the nominal fixed-effects led to greater
regional equalisation. The decline of the London premium
for the regional fixed-effects accounted for 32% of the rise
in regional inequalities between London and the nine
regions. Gender variables accounted overall for 10% of
the increase in regional inequalities. This small aggregate
effect is the result of conflicting price and composition
effects. The national increase in female participation
implied an increase in regional inequality because of the
lower gender gap in London. The relatively stronger
increase in female participation in the nine regions
reinforced this push towards greater inequality and the
national decline in the gender gap reinforced this. But the
23
stronger relative decline in the gender gap in the nine
regions moved in the opposite direction. For experience,
the overall effect is one of cross-region equalisation.
The combined effect of the regional fixed-effects, gender
and experience variables accounts negatively for 47% of
the rise in inequality. In other words, if it were not for
education, inequalities between London and the nine
regions would have decreased significantly. Overall
education accounts for 147% of the increase in regional
inequalities. 
It’s important to break things down
It is interesting to note that across all variables, the fourth
component, relating to the evolution of cross-regional
differences in the returns to individual characteristics (i.e.
convergence in this case), accounts for 69% of the rise in
inequality. This highlights the importance of taking a disag-
gregated approach to regional inequalities. In the UK
between 1982 and 1997, the most important cause of the
increase in aggregate inequality is convergence in the
returns to labour market characteristics (experience and
education). In other words, differences in average wages
across regions in 1982 were actually lower than would
have been predicted by the differences in characteristics
across regions. Regional differences in the returns to
labour market characteristics in the early 1980s helped to
hide regional inequalities which resulted from the differ-
ences in labour force composition. The decline in these
price differences over the 1980s and 1990s, then,
contributed to increased differences in average wages. 
It is also worth noting that the evolution of regional prices
for goods and housing on the one hand and that of the
returns to labour market characteristics on the other are
unrelated. But there is a positive link between the evolution
of regional prices and that of the population in UK regions.
Over the period, the population of London and the south
east increased by 6.5% compared with 3.3% for the nine
regions – a marked population shift towards the south. This
may have been triggered by the initially more favourable
sectoral composition of this area (business services, 
hi-tech, etc). This rise in demand for labour attracted more
workers, which in turn caused a rise in the demand for
other types of workers (personal services, etc) – the trends
reinforced each other. This inevitably created widening
divergence in prices, with land prices in particular rising
sharply in London and the south east. These price effects
may be so important as to make these two regions
unaffordable for the least skilled workers – many of whom
end up leaving. This in turn could explain the increasingly
uneven distribution of skills observed in the country. 
Implications for policy
Our results suggest that there is no large labour market
unfairness across UK regions. Regional inequalities
caused by differences in returns to labour market charac-
teristics have decreased significantly. But at the same time,
the differences in the composition of the labour force
across regions have become more pronounced. If the
objective is to equalise earnings for comparable individu-
als, there may therefore be no case for a regional policy
aimed at ironing out regional differences of this kind. That
doesn’t of course mean that there can be no efficiency
gains from regional policy. For example, the increasingly
uneven distribution of skills across regions is at least partly
the result of strong institutional restrictions on the supply of
land in London and the south east. It may be tempting to
argue for some planning deregulation in this area. That
would be premature, however, since an even greater
concentration of population in London and the south east
could have a significant impact on the environment and on
congestion. Such reforms are also likely to have distribu-
tive effects through potentially large changes in house
prices everywhere in the country.
There is one potential bias in our findings. The analysis
presented here refers to only one particular geographical
scale: the region. Inequality has also risen within UK
regions, at country level. Even at the regional level, what
may be true for wages may not be true for other important
issues like health or the educational attainment of young-
sters. Our findings should therefore be seen as setting the
agenda for further research rather than as a blueprint for
regional policy.
Gilles Duranton and Vassilis Monastiriotis are members of the
Department of Geography and Environment at the LSE. Gilles
Duranton is a member of the CEP.
This article is based on CEP Discussion Paper 485, Mind the
Gaps: The Evolution of Regional Inequalities in the UK 
1982-1997, by Gilles Duranton and Vassilis Monastiriotis
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For education, too, the pattern of
declining divergence is visible.
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n 2000, the numbers of households on the Internet rose
sharply throughout the world. In the UK, about a third of all
households were online by the end of 2000, placing Britain
below only North American and Scandinavian countries in
the extent of Internet access. 11 million people in Britain used
the Internet every month from their home in September 2000
– a number certain to grow.
At the beginning of 2000 the Internet economy boomed
with investors throwing cash at almost anyone with a
business plan that involved the Internet. Digital tulips?
Count me in. Internet fashion company? Sounds good.
Free Internet service? Let’s start up.
But by the end of the year, the bodies of dot.coms lay
strewn along the ground. Share prices for business to
consumer Internet firms plummeted, and many questioned
whether even highly successful Internet firms like Amazon
would eventually turn a profit. 
It’s global
The great advantage of the Internet is that it provides
potentially massive quantities of information at low cost to
persons anywhere in the world – the globalisation of what
many economists believe is the key to economic progress
and success: knowledge and information. But what will
people do with this explosion of potential information? Will
the Internet change buying habits or social behaviour and
create a genuine world community? Or will it turn out to be
more hype than reality? These are some of the questions
the Centre for Economic Performance is now seeking to
address and in November 2000, a ground-breaking confer-
ence took place at the Centre.
What is the Internet Doing to the Economy, Labour, and
Society? illuminated some of the ways in which the Internet
is affecting business and society (and it was held in the
midst of the dot.com turbulence). The Conference marked
the launch of Centre efforts to analyse the reality of the
Internet economy and to exploit the online digital data that
will change work in the social sciences in the future. 
The business world
The mid-Cambrian explosion in life forms that Stephen Jay
Gould describes in his book Wonderful Life was, to
paleontologists, one of the most exciting periods in the
The Internet:
hype vs reality
The millennium year was the best time and the worst time for that
(growing) part of the world economy associated with the Internet.
Richard Freeman explains how the CEP has been responding to the
changes and challenges which the Internet has brought.
By Richard Freeman
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history of the world. Thousands of diverse creatures found
themselves competing in a new environment. Most would
become extinct, but some would leave descendents who
would survive for aeons. 
The Internet economy explosion in business form in the late
1990s-early 2000s is an equally exciting period for econo-
mists. Most of the new businesses – some say 90% – will
fail as the market weans out those that can deliver value
and make profits from those that cannot do so. The dynam-
ics of firms forming and failing or succeeding represents
the essence of capitalism  la Schumpeter. It offers a strik-
ing opportunity for economists and other social scientists
to study the dynamics of economic change.
The CEP conference paid particular attention to two types
of market developments: consumer auctions and recruit-
ment sites.
Internet auctions
One striking development in the new Internet economy is
the development of auction sites to sell goods from
consumer to consumer; from business to consumer; and
from business to business. By auctioning a good to
consumers around the world, sellers can obtain higher
revenues than they could otherwise get. Consumers can
get bargains on goods that they would never previously
have had access to. By bidding on goods, moreover,
consumers send a signal to firms about their interest in the
firm’s goods and the price they are willing to pay. This infor-
mation can help firms set prices and provide firms with
information on potential purchasers for comparable
products in the future.
Consumer behaviour at e-auctions diverges from the
simplest models of auctions that economists have used to
analyse bidding on auctions. Consumers tend to delay
putting in their bids until very late in the timing of the
auction, rather than specifying a reservation bid at the
outset. One reason seems to be to avoid setting off a price
war. Another is that consumers with expertise in a particu-
lar product – for instance antiques – want to keep that
knowledge private, for fear that once others know that
someone views a particular antique as valuable, they will
also bid, raising the price and reducing the possibility that
the expert can benefit from her special knowledge. 
Recruitment sites
By the end of 2000 there were approximately 400 job
boards and Internet recruitment sites in the UK, and about
5,000 such sites in the US. The most popular type of Web-
based recruitment was the job board – a simple listing of
jobs comparable to newspaper classified advertisements.
But the business form with the greatest potential value
added are those sites that include searchable CV
databases and search engines to enable an employer to
whittle down potential employees to a small number of
applicants most compatible with its job needs.
E-recruitment should reduce the time spent by workers
searching for the appropriate job and the time spent by
firms looking for the employee with the right set of skills.
Employers could find someone who has the required skills
for any job at the click of a mouse. By lowering frictional
unemployment it should reduce unemployment rates.
Public employment services in Sweden and Germany,
among other countries, have made great use of Internet
recruitment. The CV of every unemployed person in
Germany is available on the Web for employers. The UK
public employment service will use IT to have information
on all available jobs at every job centre this year.
But there are other potentially less desirable possible
outcomes from Internet recruitment. It could be that the
Internet will focus employer demand on a limited number of
“super star” workers, whose wages will be bid up, while
normal workers will suffer. The Internet will increase the
brain drain from less advanced countries to the west,
making it more difficult for those countries to develop.
Throughout the Third World, people with access to the
Internet log on and check the jobs available in London,
New York, Munich, and anywhere else they are interested
in. Mobility via Internet information will benefit those
workers and their employers, but may not benefit the
citizens in poor countries whose taxes paid for their educa-
tion.
Social behaviour
The Internet is also influencing the way non-profit organisa-
tions operate. The CEP conference examined the use that
unions were beginning to make of the Internet. According
to Eric Lee, the world authority on online union activity,
union websites have changed from first-generation
brochure sites, with a grinning picture of the general secre-
tary, to hi-tech savvy third-generation sites incorporating the
latest multimedia and clever programming. The information
provided is, he argues, creating a new internationalism
among labour that harks back to labour internationalism
before World War II.
Some unions try to enlist members online and others have
begun to experiment with e-unions, to organise members in
fields where the members are never close enough to have
traditional meetings. Others have used the Web to conduct
votes and provide union members with a wide range of
information. The ability to perform some activities online
could be essential in further democratising unions. As in
the business area, there are several competing models of
how unions adjust to the Internet.
Politics too
After the US Florida voting fiasco, the notion that the
By the end of the year, the bodies of dot.coms
lay strewn along the ground.
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Richard Freeman is Co-Director of the CEP and runs the Internet
research programme. He is also Professor of Economics at
Harvard University.
A full set of papers from the conference is available: the Centre’s
website (http://cep.lse.ac.uk) has full details.
Internet offers potential ways to strengthen democracy
from voting over the Web to connecting government and
citizens over the Web has taken on a greater sense of
reality. The Internet can increase connectivity between the
government and its citizens. Millions of citizens throughout
the world currently pay taxes through the Internet. Millions
download government forms on the Web rather than
traipsing off to some office or using the ordinary mail. E-
government is in its infancy, and here too different groups
and states are experimenting with alternative models; but it
will undoubtedly make the democracy of the 21st century
very different from the democracies of the 19th century.
As people communicate more and more on the Web, the
way they write and speak (and think?) will change. Young
people who use the Web seem to have developed an “on-
line” language, with short words and catch symbols for
phrases. Young Internet users also seem to have devel-
oped exceptional multi-tasking skills with some children
holding up to six conversations online simultaneously. The
increased use of the Internet in homes highlights the
challenge that the “digital-divide” creates for the social
structure of modern economies. Internet use in the UK is
biased towards the south east and higher income groups,
and it may be that some government intervention is needed
to provide PCs and cheap Internet access to less well-off
parts of the population. It is intriguing that the two parts of
the world which lead the Internet economy are the US,
with a highly unequal distribution of income and skills, and
Scandinavia, with an unusually equal distribution of income
and skills.
It will affect CEP as well
The Internet will also change the way
the Centre conducts its research in
the future. Computerised datasets
have greatly advanced empirical
social science by allowing
researchers to analyse huge bodies
of data. The Internet will revolutionise
this even further by providing virtually 
real-time data on economic transactions, enabling
researchers to watch markets determining prices and
transactions. If computerised data sets provided us with a
microscope to look into various fields, the richness and
amount of data provided by the Internet provides us with
an electron microscope; a chance to look at every little
thing going on and thus a much larger scope for analysis. 
There is undoubtedly much hype about the Internet. 
The CEP conference highlighted the reality that this major
innovation is changing economic and social behaviour. It
also highlighted the great uncertainty about the way these
changes will proceed. Stay tuned – or rather online – to
see which directions the Internet will be taking and to see
how Centre researchers will be using this new tool to
better understand the UK economy. 
By the end of 2000 there were approximately 400 job boards and internet
recruitment sites in the UK, and about 5000 such sites in the US.
Brain development
and childhood
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By Leon Feinstein
When it comes to helping disadvantaged children, what can social
scientists learn from neurological research? Leon Feinstein reports on
a CEP conference.
R
apid scientific advances in brain science and
genetics have potentially significant implica-
tions for the extent to which policy can help
disadvantaged children become fully participa-
tory members of the economy and society. But
most social scientists and policy-makers know
little about the latest advances in brain science and child-
hood development nor how they might exploit this accumu-
lation of knowledge in order to frame more effective
policies which could help more children. 
The trouble is that brain scientists, social scientists, and
policy-makers rarely interact. The Centre for Economic
Performance held a conference in the summer of 2000 on
the theme of the early years as part of what is intended to
be a longer-term effort to develop contacts between social
scientists and their colleagues in the natural sciences.
What Do We Know about Brain Development and
Childhood Interventions? brought together a number of
leading practitioners in neuroscience, biological psychiatry,
human psychology, and economics, as well as UK policy-
makers responsible for devising and evaluating early child-
hood programmes. There was no shortage of questions for
the respective disciplines to address collectively.
What’s the connection? 
Social scientists and policymakers have debated endlessly
about the effects of government policies aimed at helping
poorly adjusted and troubled children and adolescents.
Many advocates have stressed the need to intervene very
early in the child’s life, up to three years old. But to what
extent are such arguments supported by the scientific
evidence? 
There has also been considerable argument about the
merits, or otherwise, of pre-school programmes aimed at
helping children from under-privileged backgrounds. Some
of the gains of such programmes appear to be only tempo-
rary, while others appear to benefit the child much later in
life. Some programmes seem to work better than others.
Can the scientific evidence help policymakers assess the
relative merits of one programme compared with another?
Can other disciplines help social scientists judge why
programmes have variable success rates? To what extent
can successful small programmes be scaled up at a
national level? 
Similar questions arise when trying to decide how best to
develop policies with limited resources. The proponents of
early policy intervention argue that such policies can have a
bearing on what happens to a person later in life – such as
the likelihood of their being unemployed or involved in
crime. These issues are particularly important for the UK,
since current policies envisage significant investment in the
Sure Start programme, targeted at the very young. Sure
Start gives local areas considerable leeway in deciding
how to run policies affecting the very young. Providing
helpful guidance as to which policies work best obviously
makes sense. 
And the conclusions?
As the conference progressed it became clear that neuro-
logical science can provide considerable insight for policy
formulation. The most significant issues to emerge over two
days of discussion were:
n There is considerable plasticity to the brain. Brains
change and adjust to environmental stimuli throughout a
person’s life, though plasticity declines with age.
Environments with normal stimuli lead to greater brain
development than impaired environments. 
n Synapses, connections between brain cells, form at an
early age and are then pared back, but this does not mean
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that the only time to intervene is early. The paring back is
part of healthy brain development and how we use the
synapses we have may well be as important for develop-
ment as the initial growth in synapses. Policy should not
focus exclusively on children up to three years-old.
n Different aspects of behaviour and brain function have
different points at which intervention is most fruitful. For
example, when it comes to languages, early training in
foreign languages is more efficient than later training
because the phonological aspects of language are more
readily learned before the age of eight. But few eight year-
olds can grasp calculus, so it makes sense to teach
advance mathematics at a later stage.
n Genes affect the likelihood that individuals will have
specific behavioural characteristics. There is variation in the
extent to which such characteristics are inherited: but even
those heavily influenced by heredity can still also be influ-
enced by environmental factors. Genetic analysis can be
used to inform intervention strategy but ultimately policies
aimed at influencing childhood development should be
judged in their own right.
n The old-fashioned debate about the relative importance
of nature and nurture is seriously misleading in its implica-
tion that the two are independent. There is an important
interplay between genes and environment so that many
outcomes depend on the two working together. Genes
influence both the likelihood that individuals will experience
particular risk environments and also influence their
susceptibility to those risk environments. Because of that,
the outcomes of any given genetic pattern or any given
environmental situation will vary substantially among individ-
uals. This has implications for the individual tailoring of
some intervention policies.
n Successful pre-school interventions can improve
children’s scores on standardised tests and their perfor-
mance for years into the future. But the most successful
programmes require high quality intensive resources and
are, therefore, expensive. Their effects are more likely to
persist if they are followed up in the school years. The best
programmes are often small scale, which raises questions
about how effective they will be if broadly expanded.
n Child-based interventions – those that target children –
are more effective than parent-based interventions – those
that try to get parents to interact differently with their
children. Some of the most impressive interventions place
disadvantaged children into what amounts to middle or
upper income pre-school environments for extended
periods of time.
n Science can provide tools to analyse intervention
policies. Advances in brain-scanning can measure the
effects of interventions on the physical brain. Advances in
DNA analysis can provide a better understanding of the
role of genes in various forms of social behaviour and give
early warnings to potential problems an individual may face
later in life.
Where does this leave future research?
The conference discussions highlighted the potential value
of tackling difficult questions on interventions on a multi-
disciplinary basis, bringing together researchers from the
brain sciences and the social sciences and experts in
policy development and implementation. 
One obvious direction for future research is to explore the
feasibility of adding biological data – for instance on individ-
uals’ genetic make-up – to social science databases. The
Millennium Cohort, a new British birth cohort study getting
underway in 2000-2001, will gather a wide range of data
on children born at the start of this millennium. It may be
prudent to invest now in gathering genetic data on the
cohort members and their parents for use by researchers
in the future. 
Another potentially fruitful move would be to add neurologi-
cal data to studies of the effectiveness of social interven-
tions. Medical and psychiatric researchers study the impact
of treatments on patients’ disorders at the level of biochem-
ical activity or brain functioning. It is possible that adding
measures of biochemical activity or brain functioning to
studies of the effectiveness of pre-school or school-age
interventions could help document what changes had
occurred and help generate or test hypotheses as to why. 
While brain scans are not at this stage feasible for young
children, the conference highlighted the potential value of
examining the effects of different experiences and interven-
tions on the physical brain as well as on social behaviour.
Something that has demonstrable effects on the brain
would, on the face of it, be more likely to have a long-term
effect than an alternative policy which had no discernible
impact on brain development. If the long-term behavioural
improvements found in some small-scale studies could be
traced to effects on certain aspects of the brain develop-
Few 8-year-olds can grasp calculus, so it makes sense
to teach advanced mathematics at a later stage.
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ment of those affected, we would have a much better
notion of how to develop future policy. 
The conference also identified the need for research on
implementation of policy. Given the challenges in making
large-scale social initiatives work, policy-makers and practi-
tioners need not only to learn about the best evidence from
current science, but also to find ways to motivate decision-
makers at local level to act on this information. Such
research could take the form of seminars or consultations,
the distribution of information through postings on the
Internet or mailings, and the evaluation of which groups
made most effective use of which form of information. 
The conference provided pointers for the future develop-
ment of research in this challenging area. It also underlined
the enormous potential benefits of interaction between 
the natural sciences and social scientists: and this is
something the CEP plans to develop in future, both in this
area and others.
Leon Feinstein teaches economics at Sussex University; he is
also a research associate of the CEP.
More information about the conference proceedings will soon be
available on the CEP’s website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
The best programmes are often small scale, which raises questions
about how effective they will be if broadly expanded. 
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Dear Sir
Sir Alan Budd: More transparency please!
I am writing in response to Sir Alan Budd’s article in the Autumn 2000 edition of
CentrePiece where he questions the adequacy of the Treasury Committee in holding
the members of the Monetary Policy Committee to account for their actions.
The Treasury Committee takes its role of holding the MPC to account very seriously.
Since the inception of the MPC we have held ten hearings with the MPC and, whilst it
is not practicable to invite all nine members to each hearing, over the past year we
have taken evidence from ten different members of the MPC and a number, including
the Governor, on more than one occasion. In addition the Treasury Committee always
makes a deliberate effort to spread the questioning amongst all the members of the
MPC appearing in front of us in an effort to ensure that each member does have to
justify their voting record to us.
In the Committee’s 1997 Report on “Accountability of the Bank of England” we
examined the best way to hold the MPC to account and concluded that “by bringing
information into the public domain we can help clarify the thinking and actions of those
responsible for the formulation of monetary policy and that the rigorous scrutiny 
of the basis for the policy decisions will enhance credibility and effectiveness of the
monetary policy as a whole.” We have endeavoured to follow this approach in our
hearings to date.
Hence, in reply to Sir Alan’s criticism that “only a very small proportion of the hearing is
devoted to questioning of specific decisions,” I would point out that we devote about a
third of each hearing to the important issue of specific policy decisions. However,
following the remit we set ourselves, we also believe that it is important to examine the
outlook for future policy and the key issues effecting the economy and hence we also
devote a substantial part of each hearing to covering these wider concerns.
Nevertheless the Treasury Committee, like the MPC, is always looking to improve
procedures and we will be examining our own performance as well as that of the MPC
as part of our forthcoming report on the monetary framework to be published in the
New Year.
Rt Hon Giles Radice MP
Chairman
Treasury Committee
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